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In 1995, many Islamists seemed torn about the poli-
cies and practices of the emerging Taliban in Afghan-
istan. On the one hand, the Taliban could be seen as
freedom fighters struggling against infidels (and for-
eign intervention) to create an Islamic society gov-
erned according to strict adherence to Islamic law, or
s h a ri ca. On the other hand, Taliban leaders were im-
plementing extremely repressive measures not only
against the Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs Ð that had long
coexisted with AfghanistanÕs majority Muslims Ð but
also against Afghani Muslims. Why did the Taliban
create such uneasiness among Islamists? The follow-
ing examines transnational dialogues among Is-
lamists as they debated whether or not to support
the Taliban.
T r a n s n a t i o n a l
Islamist Debates
about the Taliban
The late 20t h century was marked by a wide
range of Islamist frames Ð incorporating
anti-colonialist, anti-leftist, integrativist, rev-
olutionary, and even Marxist ideas Ð that
sometimes competed and sometimes ac-
commodated each other. The integrativist
frame, which focuses on working within ex-
isting political structures to realize a more
Islamist society, dates back at least to Has-
san al-Banna in the 1920s. Those who
adopted and developed these ideas have
been characterized as integrativist because
the norms of dialogue, debate, and consen-
sus are embraced as key mechanisms for
achieving social change. When, by the mid-
1980s, a number of Arab regimes were faced
with economic and other crises that
brought increasing political dissent, many
opted for limited liberalization as a mecha-
nism for channelling dissent into control-
lable institutions. A number of Islamist
groups, many with affinities for BannaÕs in-
tegrativist thinking, opted to enter into
these political systems and contest public
elections for state offices. They formed po-
litical parties, created civil society organiza-
tions, and formulated party platforms. Over
the next two decades, a distinct public
sphere emerged around the dialogue
among these integrativists, with such wide-
ly heard and engaged voices as those of
Rashid Ghanoushi, Hassan Turabi, and Abd
al-Karim Soroush.
Within this transnational Islamist public
sphere, a consensus began to emerge
around the central norms of this integra-
tivist frame. Innumerable voices weighed in
on the question of Islam and democracy,
while newly formed Islamist political parties
shared their experiences, both successes
and failures. The late 1990s also saw the
emergence of a network of Islamist research
institutes, many of which are open to for-
eign and non-Muslim researchers in an ef-
fort to demonstrate their integrativism in
practice. Along with mechanisms such as
the internet, these research institutes have
begun to play a significant role in shaping
the content of the transnational dialogues
through their conferences and reciprocal in-
vitations to sister institutions in other coun-
tries. With such exchanges, transnational
debates emerge around ÔhotÕ topics such as
civil society, the role of women, local gover-
nance, and the environment.
By the time the Taliban emerged in Sep-
tember 1994, integrativist voices were
widely heard within transnational Islamist
debates. While the dialogue focused on the
most appropriate means of bringing about
an Islamic society, integrativist arguments
demonstrated a significant level of accom-
modation. Armed struggle, for example, re-
mained acceptable in anti-colonialist and
authoritarian settings. When Islamists are
not given the opportunity to work within
the system, they reasoned, they have no al-
ternative but to struggle against that sys-
tem. Thus integrativist Islamists have no dif-
ficulty justifying the political violence, for
example, of Hamas and Hizbollah against Is-
rael (an occupying force), or of the FIS and
its many militant offshoots in their struggles
against AlgeriaÕs repressive military regime.
The problem for integrativist Islamists was
not that their strategies directly conflicted
with the policies of the Taliban since the
contexts of each political struggle were
quite different. Rather, difficulties arose
around the boundaries of justifiable behav-
iour. Working through democratic institu-
tions, even if it entails accepting the right of
secular or leftist groups to coexist, is justifi-
able in terms of the Islamic norms of consul-
tation and consensus; political violence is
justifiable in contexts in which such oppor-
tunities are not available. The contention
around the Taliban arose not because of the
TalibanÕs armed struggle to establish a state,
but because of its highly repressive domes-
tic policies toward Afghani Muslims. In this
regard, three issues of contention stand out
as significant in integrativist debates about
the Taliban: the role of women, pluralism,
and beards.
Women under 
the Taliban regime
A decree issued in November 1996 by the
TalibanÕs religious police, for example, placed
the following restrictions on women:
Women have been subjected to virtual
house arrest, and movement in public is
highly restricted, even when wearing the
mandatory head-to-toe b u r k h a. Women are
forbidden to visit tailors, and tailors are like-
wise forbidden to take the measurements of
female customers. GirlsÕ schools have been
closed entirely, as were many boysÕ schools
following the prohibition of female teachers
in male classrooms. And of course, women
are forbidden not only from political partici-
pation, but also from even voicing issues
within the public sphere.
This treatment of women has been be ex-
tremely problematic for integrativist Is-
lamists not because they hold liberal views
toward women, but because they have
sought to extend the norms of participa-
tion, consensus, and consultation to include
the voices of women, who make up half of
the Islamic community, or u m m a h. In this re-
gard, the education of women is widely
viewed as desirable. While the question of
womenÕs political participation is somewhat
more contested, the policies of the Taliban
toward women are simply not justifiable for
integrativists on either strategic or Islamic
grounds. While the Q u r ' a n does state that
no woman can lead the community, it also
praises women whose efforts had been inte-
gral to the survival of the first Muslims. Such
debates have unfolded in transnational Is-
lamist public spheres including on the inter-
net, at conferences and workshops, and in a
Women, you should not step outside your
residence. If you go outside the h o u s e ,
you should not be like women who used
to go with fashionable clothes wearing
much cosmetics.1
range of publications available across na-
tional borders. Numerous Islamist web sites,
for example, circulated petitions and decla-
rations condemning the TalibanÕs repressive
policies toward women. ÔThis is not true
IslamÕ, they declared to an audience of Mus-
lims and non-Muslims alike.
Pluralism within transnational
Islamist debates
The question of women is related to an-
other contentious issue: pluralism. The cur-
rent integrativist frame was shaped partly in
response to the opportunities that opened
to Islamist groups beginning in the 1980s.
As these ÔmoderatesÕ deliberated over when
and to what extent an Islamist programme
can be reconciled with the norms of liberal
democracy, they focused on such Islamic
notions as consensus ( i j m ac) and consulta-
tion (s h u r a). In the process, the norm of a
plurality of voices became central to the in-
tegrativist Islamist frame. Of course, all of
society should be Islamic, but within such
confines a plurality of voices is both desir-
able and necessary.
Although 90% of Afghanis belong to the
Sunni Hanafi sect, Afghani society has al-
ways been marked by the presence of nu-
merous minority groups, including ShiÕi
Muslims, several Pashtun tribes, Tajik clans,
Ismaelis, Bukharan Jews, Hindus, and Sikhs.
IntegrativistsÕ contextual reading of Islam
not only allows for a diversity of Muslim
voices, but calls for actively engaging other
voices in the public sphere. The Taliban, in
contrast, are extremely intolerant of even
alternative frames within Muslim dia-
logues. While the debate about the limits
and meaning of pluralism has long been
prominent within transnational Islamist
debates, the issue here is that integrativists
have highlighted the desirability of a plu-
rality of voices in a manner that makes the
TalibanÕs repression of such voices difficult
to accept.
What is Islamic about a beard?
Perhaps the issue that has drawn the most
outrage from integrative Islamists concerns
the TalibanÕs demand that men grow their
beards. In a decree issued in December
1996, the Taliban declared that men are not
only forbidden to shave their beards, but
that their beards must be at least a fist in
length. To further enforce this regulation,
any man who shaves and/or cuts his beard
within less than a one-and-a-half-month in-
terval should be arrested and imprisoned
until his beard becomes bushy.3
For integrativist Islamists, many of whom
are clean shaven and/or wear Western-style
suits, the beard mandate is patently absurd.
Muhammad Zabara, an integrativist Islamist
member of YemenÕs Islah Party (who sports
ÕGrowing a beard is the tradition of
IslamÕs Prophet Muhammad that must
be followed by Muslims. Men without
a beard [at least a fist in length] will not
b e considered for jobs or services.Õ
Mullah Mohammad Omar,
Leader of the Taliban2
a trim moustache and no beard), expressed
bewilderment with respect to the decree:
I donÕt understand it. What is Islamic about
a beard? Yes, the Prophet Muhammad wore a
beard, but what are non-Arab Muslims to do?
Does this mean that the Muslims of Indonesia
are infidels? It must mean that I am not a
good Muslim.4
One might have concluded that because
these policies of the Taliban clearly conflict
with the central integrativist norms, the de-
bate among integrativists within transna-
tional Islamist public spheres would have
quickly moved to condemn the Taliban.
However puzzling it may be, they did not.
Over the course of several years, a consen-
sus did emerge over the idea that many Tal-
iban practices violated the tolerant spirit of
Islam, particularly through the contribu-
tions of prominent thinkers to the debate.
The voice of Rashid Ghounoushi, for exam-
ple, has been central to debates around the
issue of reconciling the norms of an Islamic
frame with the norms of liberal democracy.
Within transnational debates condemning
Taliban practices, his voice has been among
the most prominent. Yet early responses to
the Taliban were indecisive precisely be-
cause the integrativist frame had no clearly
articulated position on what policies of a
ruling Muslim regime were too extreme for
its Muslim citizenry.
As an Islamist group struggling to realize
an Islamic society in Afghanistan, the Tal-
iban was welcomed by the broader transna-
tional Islamic community. Only when its
policies towards its own Muslim citizenry
seemed to violate the central norms of inte-
grativist Islamists did criticism of the Taliban
emerge. Personal ties have exacerbated
these tensions, as many Islamist groups
have members who were trained in
Afghanistan in the 1980s (though those
connections do not necessarily remain
strong). There may also be issues of iconog-
raphy at work, in that integrativists initially
found it difficult to condemn any group that
was struggling for Islam in the face of for-
eign domination, secularism, and general
adversity. Yet as the Taliban received con-
siderable attention within international
public spheres of debate, integrativists rec-
ognized that they faced the challenge of
distinguishing themselves from the Taliban
in their ultimate social objectives. By 1997,
just two years after transnational Islamist
debates about the Taliban emerged, inte-
grativists seemed to have agreed that Tal-
iban policies did not reflect, in their view,
the true spirit of Islam. u
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